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COMMENTS
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-INVESTIGATORY PowER OF CoNPREss;vALIDITY OF THE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE INQUIRIES
INTO PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS-The recent probe
into the motion picture industry by _the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities and the resulting indictment of ten witnesses for
contempt of Congress have served not only to keep this controversial
committee in the publicity spotlight, but have also raised some constitutional questions which have long gone unanswered. The indictment
of the ten recalcitrant witnesses under Title 2, section I 92, of the
United States Code 1 followed their citation for contempt by the House
1

52 Stat. L. 942, c. 594 (1938). "Every person who having been summoned
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of Representatives 2 for refusal to give direct answers to the Committee's questions: "Are you a member of the Screen Writers Guild?" and
"Are you now, or have you ever been, a memb~r of the Communist
Party?" 8 There is a good chance that some of these cases may reach
the Supreme Court,4 but in any event the problems involved warrant
study at this time, particularly in view of the growing boldness of the
committee in projecting its inquiries into a field dangerously near the
dividing line between private affairs and legitimate Congressional obj ectives.5
as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to· give testimony or to
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint
committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question- pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more
than $1000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than
one month nor more than twelve months." This ·statute, in similar form, has been
in force since 1857. II Stat. L. 155, c, 19, § I. When this criminal sanction is invoked to punish contumacious committee witnesses, the usual procedure is for the
committee to submit the fact of contempt to the House or Senate in the form of a
report and move for adoption of a resolution directing that the presiding officer certify
the statement of facts to the District Attorney. The latter must then bring the case
before a grand jury for indictment. 52 Stat. L. 942, c. 594 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1940)
§ 194. An alternative sanction is imprisonment of the witness for the duration of the
session, by direct order of the House ~r Senate. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19
U.S.) 204 (1821); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S.Ct. 448 (1917). The
fact that a contumacious. witness has been imprisoned by direct order of the House or
Senate will not preclude his punishment for the same contumacious act under the
criminal statute. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677 (1897). The criminal
sanction m;iy be imposed even though the contumacious act no longer obstructs the legislative process. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S.Ct. 375 (1935).
2 H. Res. 363, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 374, 375, 376, and 377, 80th Cong.,
1st sess., 93 CoNG. REc. 10878-10912 (1947).
8
All ten of the witnesses were indicted for r_efusal to answer the question concerning membership in the Communist Party, and eight were indicted on a second
count for their refusal to answer the question concerning membership in the Screen
Writers Guild. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1947, I :6.
·
4
On Feb. 16, 1948, after this paper was written, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the case of Leon Josephson, who had earlier been convicted in a New
York Federal District Court of contempt of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissented from the order. N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. I, 1948, 2:5, 43 :6. The decision to deny certiorari is probably indicative of the Court's view of the constitutionality of the committee itself, but would
appear to have no necessary bearing on 'certain of the problems involved in studying
the power of the committee to inquire into professional affiliations and political beliefs of the witnesses.
G" • • ; Neither house is invested with a 'general' power to inquire into private
affairs and compel disclosures ..•••" McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 173,
47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
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I.

Although the House Committee on Un-American Activities has
been in existence for nearly ten years,6 the range of its investigatory
power has never been determined by the Supreme Court. 7 The scope
of the investigating authority of all Congressional committees, however, is limited by two general standards, one legislative, and the other
constitutional. Any question asked of a witness must necessarily be
pertinent to an investigation which meets both standards before a refusal to answer can be considered contumacious. Clearly, a Congressional committee has no power to investigate unless it has been granted
that power by the House of Congress which created the committee.
Similarly, a committee which has been granted the power to investigate
cannot carry its investigations beyond the limits set by Congress in
defining the subject-matter of the inquiry.8 That aspect of the validity
of an inquiry, however, can usually be readily ascertained simply by
reference to the resolution authorizing the investigation, so that the
principal problem is not with the scope of the inquiry as authorized by
Congress, but with the constitutional capacity of Congress to grant the
committee the authority which it seeks to exercise. Although there may
be some possibility that even the broad language of the Congressional
8
The committee was originally created as a special committee in 1938 by--H. Res.
282, 75th Cong., 3d sess., 83 CoNC;;. REc. 7568 (1938). It was continued by successive annual resolutions until 1945, when it was made a standing committee by
H. Res. 5, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 91 CoNG. REc. IO (1945). The present committee
is authorized by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 812 at 828,
§ 121 (b) (1) (q).
7
The validity of the committee's ac;tivities has recently been passed upon and
upheld by the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. See
United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (1947); United States v. Barsky, 72 F. Supp.
165 (1947); and United States v. Dennis, 72 F. Supp. 417 (1947). The same court
is scheduled to conduct separate trials of each of the ten Hollywood witnesses beginning
Feb. 24, 1948. On Feb. 16, 1948, the trial court denied motions to dismiss the indictments and for change of venue, the defendants urging the motions to dismiss on the
grounds that the committee itself is unconstitutional and had no power to inquire into
political beliefs. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1948, 30:6.
8
"When evidence is taken by a committee, the pertinency of questions propounded must be determined by reference to the scope of the authority vested in the
committee by the Senate." Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597
at 613, 49 S.Ct. 452 (1929). Resolutions authorizing investigations are not usually
very restrictive. The member of Congress who introduces the resolution authorizing
an investigation frequently becomes chairman of the investigating committee (as was
true of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Mr. Martin Dies introducing the resolution and then being named chairman), and the tendency is to draft
resolutions providing such committees with broad powers. McGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CoNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE PowER 53 (1940).
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authorization of the House Committee on Un-American Activities'
does not warrant the committee's probe of individual professional and
political affiliations in its investigation of Hollywood Communism, in
general this problem will be laid aside in favor of the problem of the
committee's constitutional power.
2.

The usual constitutional objection to the power of a Congressional
committee to investigate a given subject is that the inquiry bears no
relation to any. valid legislative purpose.10 The power of inquiry is
only an auxiliary power of Congress; it is an implied power whose'
scope is limited to investigations "necessary and appropriate to make
the express powers effective." 11 As a necessary corollary, the refusal
of a witness to answer questions pertinent to an unconstitutional investigation cannot subject him to punishment for contempt.12 The development of a standard by which to judge the limits of the Congressional
investigative power has been quite slow, but the relatively few cases
on the subject have indicated a progressive tendency to broaden the
9 The committee is authorized to investigate "(1) the extent, character, and
objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion
within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated
from foreign .countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form
of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation
thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 60 Stat. L. 81 2
at 828, § 121 (b) (1) (q) (1946). All earlier resolutions by the House were identical.
10
The constitutional question may be raised by petition for habeas corpus seeking
discharge under process of attachment issued to compel testimony [McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927)], or from imprisonment after trial
for violation of 2 U.S.C. (1940) § 192 [In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677
(1897)] bu,t not before trial, [Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 35 S.Ct. 54 (1914) ],
or on motion to dismiss the indictment [U.S. v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F.
Supp. 58].
11
McGrain·v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 173, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
12
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). If a recalcitrant witness is to
avoid punishment, either under the statute or by direct action o~ the House or Senate,
he must either successfully challenge the validity of the investigation [Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)], or show that the questions were not relevant
to the inquiry [Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268 (1929), holding also that the question of pertinency is one of law)], or possibly that his individual
rights have been unduly infringed [Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (Oral
opinion, S.Ct. D.C., 1936) 63 U.S. L~w WEEK 646 (1936) ]. Schull, "Congressional
Investigations and Contempts," 63 U.S. L. REv. 326 (1929). Of course, the committee or Congress may decide to take no action at all against the defiant witness. See,
e.g., S. Rep. 43, pt. 10, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 72 CoNG. REc. 1 n 51 ( 1930); S. Rep.
24, 72d Cong., 2d sess., 75 CoNG. REc. 1063 (1931); and 6 CANNON, PRECEDENTS
OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 2d ed., 500-503 (1936), concerning the successful challenge of a Senate committee by Bishop James Cannon.
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permissive scope of the power.13 The power of inquiry has been recognized where the purpose of the inquiry is to gather facts in connection
with a possible impeachment,14 or the censure or expulsion of a member of Congress,15 or to aid in judging the qualifications or the validity
of the election of a member.16 Perhaps of greatest importance is the
recognition of the power to inquire as a basis for possible future legislation,11 and to determine the efficacy of laws already passed.18 Moreover, it is immaterial that Congressional intent to acquire the information as an aid to legislation does not expressly appear, for if the subjectmatter of the 'investigation is such that its results could be used in
the aid of legislation, there is a presumption that it was so intended.19
Whether the Court would go behind an expressed Congressional purpose in order to ascertain the existence or absence of an actual purpose
to use the information in aid of legislation is a question pertinent to
any inquiry into the validity of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The committee is authorized to investigate "all other questions in relation [ to subversive and un-American propaganda activities]
that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 20 A
survey of the committee's accomplishments would indicate that it has
not been of much aid to Congress in recommending "remedial legislation." 21 In fact, the committee's principal objective to date has
seemed to be to expose to public view those persons and organizations
which it considers subversive or un-American.22 If the Court is willing
to take at face value the statement of purpose which the House has
provided for the committee's guidance, the result would appear to be
to give Congress a power of almost unlimited inquiry, effectively
emasculating the rule that a Congressional investigation must be linked
to some constitutional Congressional function. But if the court goes
18
For an analysis of the earlier cases, see LuCJ;:, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES 499 et
seq. (1924).
14
See the dictum in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 at 190 (1880).
15
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677 (1897).
16
Reed v. County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376, 48 S.Ct. 531 (1928). The
power to investigate elections includes primaries. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S.
564, 57 S.Ct. 535 (1937).
17
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
18
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268 (1929).
19
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
20
Supra, note 9.
21
The remarks of Representative Holifield in the debate on the Hollywood contempt citations would indicate that the Committee's record of recommendations was
"exactly zero." 93 CoNG. REc. 10898 (1947). Cf. OGDEN, THE DIEs CoMMI'ITEE,
2d ed., 229 (1945), summarizing the recommendations of the first report of the
committee.
22
9 Hearings before Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities on
H. Res. 282, 5447 (1939).
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behind the expressed objective of the investigation, and if it then finds
that the sole purpose of the committee is to focus public attention on
activities which the committ~e considers subversive or un-American,28
the question of whether the dissemination of information to the public
is a valid Congresional fynction might be sqarely presented. A number
of writers have aligned themselves with Woodrow Wilson's view that
the informing function Qf Congress is more important than its legislative function, 24 arguing that informing the public is a legitimate
Congressional objective which may itself support the validity of a
Congressional investigation.25 Clearly, "social leverage" is exerted
very strongly by-most Congressional investigations,26 but a committee
which operates solely as an organ for influencing public opinic;m would
seem to run counter to the view that investigation is an auxiliary power
only to the extent that it is necessary and appropriate to make effective
the express powers grant~d to Congress. 27
If, however, the committee's purpose is to aiq. Congress in the
performance of its legislative function, it is unnecessary to decide
whether dissemination of information can be fitted into any category
of express Congressional power. Although the committee's record in
aid of legislation has not been impressive,28 the lower federal courts
have not felt that fact to be a serious objection to the committee's
validity. 29 Still, the information disclosed by. the investigation might
be ari aid to Congress in legislating on such matters as. seditious conspiracy, registration of organizations carrying on certain types of propaganda, and qualifications of government employees,so or as a basis for
proposing Constitutional amendments.81 Whether or not any valid
Congressional action could result from the committee's investigations
28 Definitions of the terms "subversive" and "un-American" are discussed in 47
CoL. L. REV. 416 (1947).
.
·
24
W1LS0N, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, 15th ed., 303 (1900).
25 McGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CoNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE PoWER
23 (1940); DIMOCK, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES 59 (1929);
EBERLING, CoNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 8 (1928).
26 Several of the indicted Hollywood witnesses have been discharged or suspended from their employment. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1947, I :2.
27
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
28
See· note 21, supra.
29 United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58; United States v.
Dennis, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 417. See also Townsend v. United States,
(App. D.C. 1938) 68 App. D.C. 223, 95 F. (2d) 352, cert. den., 303 U.S. 664, 58
S.Ct. 830 (1938).
80 Other possible legislative results are suggested in United States v. Bryan, (D.C.
D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58.
81 Doubt is expressed in 47 CoL. L. REV. 416 at 425 (1947) that a Congressional
investigation could constitutionally be founded upon a purpose to propose constitutional
amendments.
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would not be in issue, for the court would certainly not pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation before it had been enacted. Although
the breadth of its language may raise some doubts, a lower federal
court recently said: "If the subject matter under scrutiny may have
any possible relevancy and materiality, no matter how remote, to
some possible legislation, it is within the power of Congress to investigate the matter. Moreover, the relevancy and the materiality of the
subject matter must be presumed." 82 Legislation directed at the suppression or control of un-American or subversive propaganda would be
a drastic measure impinging on essential civil liberties, and could be
drafted only after a thorough investigation of the "extent, character,
and objects" of such propaganda if there is to be any hope of avoiding the impact of the First Amendment under the "clear and present
danger" doctrine.88 Ten years of such investigation may not be too
long. The presumption of validity attaching to Congressional acts,84
together with the importance of any legislation that might be indicated
after a thorough inquiry into the entire range of subversive or unAmerican propaganda activities, would appear to be sufficient grounds
for finding that the House Committee on Un-American Activities is,
in general, conducting inquiries in aid of possible legislation and is
therefore constitutionally valid.85

3.
Even assuming that a constitutional challenge to the existence and
general conduct of the House Committee on Un-American Activities
would be unsuccessful, there remains a question as to the power of the
82

United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58 at 61.
This doctrine permits Congress to curb individual freedom of speech, despite
'the mandate of the First Amendment, when such speech is "used in such circumstances
and [is] of such a nature as to create a clear and present dal'lger that will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Holmes, J., in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 at 52, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).
8
' Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 at
328, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946), remarked: " ••• the Court:s duty [is] so to deal with
Congressional enactments as to avoid their invalidation unless a road to any other
decision is barred." The presumption has been variously expn,ssed in many types of
cases.
85
Certainly the trial court would adhere to its prior decisions and uphold the
committee. United States v. ~ Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58; United
States v. Dennis, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 417. These decisions pass upon the
possible constitutional arguments raised by the comment in 47 CoL. L. REV. 416
(1947), which suggested that (1) Congress cannot undertake a completely unlimited
inquisition into the area protected by the First Amendment, (2) the purpose of the
committee to accomplish by puolicity what cannot validly be done by legislation renders
the whole investigation unlawful, and (3) a standard of guilt sufficiently definite to
allow enforcement of the committee's demands by penal sanctions is not established.
88

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

( Vol. 46

committee to ask an individual witness to state his professional and
political affiliation and to punish the witness for his refusal to answer.
There are two possible objections to the power of a validly constituted
Congressional investigating committee to ask such questions of a witness, first, that the questions are not pertinent to the inquiry, and
second, that the questions infringe the witness's constitutional rights
of privacy, or of freedom of thought and association. Whether a question is pertinent to the subject under inquiry is a matter of law for the
court to decide.86 One writer has pointed out that public hearings of
Congressional"'committees are not usually necessary to the acquisition
of information, but are merely a means of acquainting the public with
the facts which the committee has already discovered. 87 That -fact,
however, would strike more at the validity of the committee itself
than at the pertinence of its questions. If the existence of the committee
is founded upon a valid legislative purpose, the fact that its questions
would reveal information already known would seem to have nothing
to do with the pertinence of the questions themselves. The problem
of the relevancy of questions asked stands on a footing entirely distinct from the problem of Congressional power to direct the inquiry.
Once the validity of the inquiry is sustained, the problem of pertinence
must be separately determined. Although the burden of proving the
relevancy of questions asked is on the prosecution in a contempt action,88
relevancy does not depend upon the probative value of the evidence,
but upon "whether the facts called for by the questions were so related
to the subjects called for by the [resolution creating the committee]
that such facts reasonably could be said to be pertinent to the question
under the inquiry." 29 Under such a standard, it would seem that a
question concerning a witness's membership in the Communist Party
or in other organizations suspected of being Communist-dominated
would be sufficiently pertinent to an inquiry into un-American activities
to sustain the validity of the question. If, then, the questions asked
the ten Hollywood witnesses were asked by a validly constituted investigating committee, and if the questions were pertinent to the committee's inquiry, it would follow that the witnesses mus_t answer unless
to compel them to do so would unlawfully invade their constitutional
rights.
86

Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268 (1929).
McGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CoNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE PowER
67 (1940). That seems to be true of the Hollywood Communism investigation. After
the recusant witnesses had refused to answer the propounded questions, records of their
membership and activities in the Screen Writers Guild and the Communist Party
were produced. See Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion
Picture Industry before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, under P.L. 601, § 121 Q(2), 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947).
88
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268 (1929).
89
Id. at 299.
81

'
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Individual constitutional rights undoubtedly serve to check the
methods which a Congressional committee may employ in conducting
its investigations. Thus, the Supreme Court has said: " ... while the
power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, it must be exerted with due regard for the rights of
witnesses," 40 and "the principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of his life." 41 The court has strongly indicated that the
individual will be protected against "all unauthorized, arbitrary, or
unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of . . . personal and
private affairs." 42 Thus, there is good reason to believe that the Fourth
Amendment would protect from punishment a witness who refused
to respond to an unreasonably broad subpoena duces tecum issued by
a Congressional investigating committee.43 The Fifth Amendment has
also been suggested as a possible restriction on the power of inquiry,
on the basis of the debatable validity of the statute purportedly protecting committee witnesses against self-incrimination.4" That the First
Amendment is a limitation on the House Committee on Un-American
Activities was unsuccessfully argued in a lower federal court/ 5 but it
would nevertheless seem that there are some barriers of the right of
privacy which the committee cannot transgress.
In its investigation of Hollywood Communism, the committee
reflected upon its own authority to act and concluded that it could
not disqualify itself.46 Following that ruling, the committee proceeded
with the examination of the ten witnesses who were later cited for
contempt. In each case,47 the only questions asked after preliminary

'° Id.

at 291. ,
Id. at 293, quoting from Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154
U.S. 447 at 478, 14 S.Ct. 1125 (1894), which in tum cited Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 at 630, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886).
42
Id. at 292.
48
Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (oral opinion, S.Ct. D.C. 1936)
3 U.S. LAw WEEK 646 (1936); noted in 36 CoL. L. REV. 841 (1936); and 45
YALE L. J. 1503 (1936). See also Hearst v. Black, (App. D.C. 1936) 87 F. (2d) 68.
This point was recognized in United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F.
Supp. 58.
44
52 Stat. L. 943 (1938), 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 634; discussed in 14 UNiv.
CHI. L. REV. 256 at 261 (1947). See also McGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CoNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE PowER 106 ( I 940). The Fourth and Fifth Amendments
were urged by counsel as invalidating Congressional investigation in Henry v. Henkel,
235 U.S. 219, 35 S.Ct. 54 (1914), but the case was disposed of on jurisdictional
grounds.
45
United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58.
46
Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, under
P.L. 601, § 121 Q(2), 80th Cong., 1st sess., at p. 289 (1947).
u Id. at 290 et seq.
41

a
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interrogatories pertained solely to the witness's own political and professional associations. Each witness was refused permission to read a
prepared explanatory statement, and each was denied the privilege of
cross-examining his "accusers." When this procedure is compared with
that followed in interrogating the witnesses who made the "accusations," 48 there is little room to doubt that at least one of the committee's objectives was to brand the recalcitrant witnesses as members
of organizations in which membership has never been legislatively
condemned, in order to drive them from their jobs 49 and expose them
to public censure. 50 Still; the questions cannot be said to be irrelevant
to an inquiry into subversive or un-American activities. So long as
pertinent questions are asked by a constitutionally valid investigating
committee, embarrassment or irritation of the witness has never yet
been held to justify his refusal to answer. 51 Legislative limitations
upon the committee's procedure may be imposed to afford the witness
a greater measure of protection against abusive methods, 52 but• there
is no clearly defined constitutional limitation upon the committee's
choice of procedure so long as the committee is valid and its questions
pertinent.
The present conception of the limits of Congressional inquisitorial
48
Some of these accusing witnesses were permitted to make vituperative remarks
and conduct a private name-calling campaign, and to give testimony of the rankest sort
of hearsay. Id., 7-286.
49
In this, the committee succeeded. Supra, note 26.
50
An argument can be made that this kind of treatment of members of allegedly
subversive groups who are called as witnesses involves an effective, if indirect, restraint
upon freedom of expression. Others who hold views similar to those of the witnesses
are served with notice that expressions of those opinions, or affiliation with organizations working to effectuate them, will subject such persons to similarly drastic economic and social consequences. Heretofore, persons of liberal views of a comparatively
mild sort were free to express, them, subject only to the threat of action for libel or
slander if they misrepresented the facts about others, or to criminal prosecution in the
event their expression gave rise to a "clear and present .danger" to public peace and
safety. Now, however, if a Congressional committee of the known predelictions of
the Un-American Activities Committee is to be given free rein, an effective deterrent
to the expression of opinion will be created, without regard to the clear and present
danger test.
51
See Townsend v. United States, (App. D.C. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 352 at 361.
52
See, e.g., H. R. 4564, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 24, 1947, introduced by
Representative Douglas; and H. R. 4641, 80th Cong., Ist sess., Dec. 4, 1947, introduced by Represent~tive Holifield. The bills are identical, and would afford to committee witnesses the right of counsel and the right to make a statement as part of the
record. The bills would also give to any person whose character or reputation had been
adversely reflected upon a committee report or witness's statement the right to have
the material stricken_ from the record or to cross-examine the persons responsible for
the report or statement. Both bills were referred to the House Committee on Rules,
which at this writing has taken no action.
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power into private affairs seems to be that the inquiry cannot be "unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable," and must be exercised with
"due regard for the rights of witnesses." 58 These limitations remain
undefined, but their strength would appear to depend in large measure
on the purpose and methods of the investigation. The entire record
of parliamentary investigations is "a history of the conflict between
the claim for civil liberties and the submission to the civic duty of disclosure." 54 Something analogous to the "clear and present danger"
doctrine may have to be developed in order to establish some sort of
standard of reasonableness by which to judge the constitutional limits
of Congressional inquiry into private affairs. Certainly, compelling a
witness to answer questions concerning his membership in the Screen
Writers Guild or the Communist Party is to permit an inquiry into
private affairs, but the propriety of the inquiry could be justified
by the need for legislative action upon the subject-matter investigated. If a clear and present danger, or some similarly-described
urgent necessity for legislation can be shown, it may well be that individual civil rights must bow to public need. The point at which the
Congressional right of inquiry overrides the individual right of privacy
has never been clearly determined by the Supreme Court. The cases
of the ten Hollywood witnesses would seem squarely to present that
issue, and the time is certainly ripe for the court to decide it. It is
difficult to predict the decision that the Supreme Court might reach
on the question, 55 but the presumption of validity of the investigation,
Supra, notes 40-42.
Ehrmann, "The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation: A Comparative Study," II UNIV. CHI. L. REV. l at 3 (1943).
55
In contrast to the constituency of the Court when Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1880), was decided, several members of the present Court have had legislative experience and contacts with Congressional committees. Landis, "Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 40 HARV. L. REV. 153
( l 926), attributes the restrictive effect of Kilbourn v. Thompson to the legislative
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viewed in the light of known .wide-spread propaganda activities of
groups and organizations of various shades of extreme political opinion
in the United States, may well lead the court to uphold the validity of
the inquiry and the pertinence of the questions, and to affirm the duty
of the witnesses to answer. At least a decision at this time would afford
a much-needed clarification of the constitutional power of inquiry when
it conflicts with personal rights of privacy.
Charles M. Soller

